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Abstract 
 
Weather conditions in Colombia vary greatly throughout the territory and therefore the 
location of electricity generating plants plays a key role in their bid pricing strategies. To 
account for these location-specific pricing strategies this paper estimates a Spatial Durbin 
Model (SDM) with monthly data gathered from the 17th largest hydraulic electricity 
generating plants of Colombia on bid prices, generation, energy inputs and positive 
reconciliation over the period January 2005-August 2015 and controlling also for the system 
marginal prices and the economy cycle. The paper reports three main results. First, firms´ bid 
prices are negatively affected by the energy inputs of the rivals, second they are unaffected 
by positive reconciliation payments to the rivals and third they are negatively affected by the 
generation amounts of the rivals. One potential policy recommendation of these results is the 
need to implement balancing markets to signal more efficiently the pricing strategies in these 
markets. 
 
Key words: Bid Price, wholesale electricity market, Spatial Durbin, Colombia 
JEL Classification: C23, D43, L25 
 
 
 
                                                          
* This paper is part of the research «models to estimate prices in the spot markets of electric generation », funded 
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1. Introduction 
 
Why does location matter for the bid pricing strategies of electricity generating plants in 
Colombia? How important is the country’s physical geography in the location decisions of 
them? These questions are unanswered in the international literature on wholesale electricity 
markets price setting.  
The Colombian wholesale electricity market is an interesting case to give an answer to these 
questions due to the specific geographical features of Colombia, the large dependence of the 
Colombian system on the hydraulic technology to generate electricity and the interlink 
between geography, climatic conditions and hydraulic technology. The physical geography 
of Colombia gives rise to all kinds of weather conditions making the periods of drought 
and/or rain to be non-homogeneous across the country. Phenomena such as “El Niño”, as 
opposed to it is generally understood, do not have the same effects in the different Colombian 
regions. So, for instance it could happen that the Northern parts of the country are suffering 
from a period of drought whereas in the central parts the climatic conditions are just opposed. 
This situation would badly affect the water reservoir levels of the electricity generating units 
located in the North and would benefit those located in the central parts since they could 
impound water and play strategically with their supplies of electricity. Strategies of this kind 
are feasible in Colombia since the wholesale electricity market is largely dependent on 
hydraulic generation on the one hand and the fact that Colombian physical geography has a 
sizeable impact on weather conditions on the other. In a broader sense, electricity generating 
units not only have to be aware of variables such as domestic demand and the level of water 
available in their reservoirs, but they should also incorporate into their reaction functions the 
geographical location of the competitors. Key variables in successful price setting strategies 
such as power generation and water reservoir levels become dependent on how well located 
a plant is with respect to the rivals. Therefore the specific location of the hydraulic generating 
plants becomes a source of strategic behavior for their bid pricing strategies. 
The use of physical geography variables has been very common within the framework of the 
traditional economic development theories and in the geographical economics (or New 
Economic Geography) literature to explain differences in levels of development between 
countries, differences in growth rates, the existence of spatial gradients in terms of incomes 
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and human capital (Hall and Jones, 1999 Gallup et al. 1999, Lopez-Rodriguez et. al. 2007, 
Lopez-Rodriguez et. al. 2011, Bruna et al. 2016). However, the use of geographic variables 
is quite scarce in the analysis of the bid pricing strategies in the electricity generation markets. 
For instance, Burnett and Zhao (2014), estimate a spatial econometrics model to explain the 
wholesale electricity prices in the market of New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Meryland (PJM). 
They conclude that the geographical nature of the transmission system influences the 
forecasting of the zonal spot prices. Popova (2004), studying the same market concludes that 
the network topology and the market structure of PJM, is responsible for the spatial 
correlation presented between spot electricity prices. 
Traditionally the bid pricing strategic behaviour of an electricity generation plant is analysed 
on account of the timing in which the energy is produced. Thus, generators consider the 
opportunity cost of producing today or keep their water levels for future production. In this 
paper we model the Colombian generators´ bid pricing strategies considering not only the 
dynamic problem (produce today versus produce in the future), but also the geographical 
location of the rivals and therefore factoring in the effects that physical geography can have 
on their decisions. To incorporate this double aspect (dynamic-spatial) a panel spatial Durbin 
model is estimated where the physical geography is incorporated in the spatial weighting 
matrix (usually labelled as W) of the model. With the geographic information related to the 
longitude and latitude of each plant of hydraulic generation, the off-diagonal elements of the 
matrix are calculated taking into account the inverse of the Euclidean distance between each 
plant. W, therefore implicitly captures the climatic specificities to which the electricity 
generating plants are exposed and though the matrix provides valuable information to infer 
the water reservoir levels and the bid pricing strategies of the rivals. The model is estimated 
with monthly data over the period January 2005 to December 2015. The results of the model 
show that the relative values (provided by the weighting matrix) on the key variables that 
explain the bid pricing strategies of electricity generating plants are more important than the 
absolute ones. These results inform on the existence of strategic behaviours in these markets 
linked to the geographical location of the plants. Therefore this paper fills the gap of the 
studies on wholesale electricity markets´ bid pricing strategies by explicitly accounting for 
the importance of physical geography and the location of plants in their strategies.  
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The remaining part of the paper is divided into five additional sections. In the second section 
a brief review of the literature is made. In the third section the structure of the spot electricity 
generation market in Colombia is explained and the stylized facts of this market are 
presented. The fourth section contains a detailed explanation of the methodology. 
Additionally this section contains a description of the variables included in the analysis. The 
fifth section presents and discusses the econometric results. Finally, in the last section, the 
main conclusions of the analysis are drawn. 
 
2. Literature review  
 
The international literature on wholesale electricity markets´ price setting has resorted to the 
use of different models; supply models (Green and Newberry, 1992; Green, 1996), auction 
models (von der Fehr and Harbord, 1993 and Brunekreeft, 2001), Cournot-type oligopoly 
models (Fabra and Toro, 2005) and econometric models (Wolfram, 1998). In all these models 
the common feature is that the electricity generators generally have market power, which is 
strategically used to plan offers which raise the spot prices and increase profits. Other studies 
using less conventional techniques are those of Hurtado et al. (2014) who resort to the use of 
an artificial intelligence model or Geman and Roncoroni (2006) and Garcia et al. (2013) who 
use a model of mean reversion and a stochastic model respectively. 
The market power of the electricity generators and its subsequent manifestation on the spot 
prices is affected not only by the oligopolistic nature of this industry but also by the strategic 
location of the plants from a geographical point of view. Physical geography influences 
weather conditions and therefore it also affects the geographical distribution of hydraulic 
generation (Laitinen et al., 2000; Mathiesen et al., 2013, Joskow and Kahn, 2002; Rangel, 
2008; Schill and Kemfert, 2011). For instance Laitinen et al., 2000 and Mathiesen et al., 
2013, argue that precipitations have a significant effect on the spot prices, which differs for 
summer and winter. This causes consumers to have different price elasticities of demand for 
each season and, therefore producers take different strategic behaviours depending on the 
season. Similarly, Joskow and Kahn (2002), using a counterfactual estimate of the 2000 
electricity prices for California, shown how a reduction in the imports of electricity due to 
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drought, has substantially increased the price of it in comparison with the previous two years 
where droughts were absent. 
Recently, several studies have analysed the strategic behaviour of hydraulic generators with 
regard to spot price setting linked to location (Burnett and Zhao, 2014; Mathiesen et al. 2013; 
Schill and Kemfert, 2011; and Rangel 2008). These authors found that the location of 
generators and their management of reserves over time plays a major role in their spot price 
setting strategies. However, to the best of our knowledge there is no research that shows the 
role played by the geographical location of the electricity generators in their bid price setting 
strategies. This papers is a first attempt to do so for Colombia.  
 
3. Colombian spot market of electricity generation: Structure and some stylized facts  
 
3.1 Some stylized facts  
The electricity generation activity in Colombia is largely dominated by hydraulic technology, 
supplying approximately between 65% and 80% of the energy, depending on the timing of 
the demand1. This causes the dependence on weather conditions to be crucial to have a 
reliable development of the system.  
The electricity demand in the Colombia´s National Interconnected System (Known as 
Sistema Interconectado Nacional-SIN-) in 2014 was 63 GWh-year, with sustained increases 
in the last two years of around 3% (XM, 2015). The electric system in Colombia consists of 
four activities: generation, transmission, distribution and commercialization. This paper 
focuses on the first type of activities, in which the electricity is produced by the generators. 
The generators differ from each other by the type of plants they have which are classified in 
four categories: a) plants with installed capacity over 20 MW (in the Colombian terminology 
these plants are known as Plantas Despachadas Centralmente), b) plants with installed 
capacity below 20 MW (Plantas no Despachadas Centralmente) c) co-generators and d) self-
generators. Only generators with plants in the classification a) and b) meet the requirements 
to participate in the Colombian electricity spot market. 
                                                          
1Large projects based on hydraulic technology, currently under construction, such as Pescadero-Ituango among 
others, lead us to believe that this situation will not change substantially in the coming years. 
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The activity of electricity generation works under economies of scale with high fixed costs 
and entry barriers. This leads to the existence of an oligopolistic market structure where the 
actors involved in this industry exercise their market power (Hurtado et al, 2014, Botero et 
al, 2013; Belleflamme and Peitz, 2010; Carlton and Perloff, 2004) by setting electricity prices 
above the total average operating costs. 
In Colombia in 2014, approximately 61% of the electricity generation corresponds to the 3 
largest industry players, while 82% is covered by the 6 largest agents2. In addition, in 2014, 
the installed capacity was mainly hydraulic (65.5%) and thermal (28.6%). The remaining 
installed capacity is made by smaller plants and co-generators (5%) (XM, 2015). 
Electricity is a homogeneous good with a highly inelastic price demand in short-term periods. 
Gutiérrez (2011) and Zapata (2011) found that for the case of Colombia the elasticity varies 
between -0.067 and -0.12. Big information asymmetries, where the users know their 
consumption levels two months after having done it are the hearth of these high values. In 
addition, a huge effort in terms of coordination to match the bids with the demand forecasting 
is required to meet the demand in real terms. 
Given the high percentage of generation through hydraulic technology, the performance of 
the wholesale electricity market depends greatly on the weather conditions of the country. 
These conditions are heavily linked to the “El Niño” phenomenon. The information provided 
by the Multivariate ENSO Index (MEI) (NOAA, 2015), allows us a better understanding of 
the importance of “El Niño” in the performance of the market. When this index takes values 
between 44 and 56 represent an intermediate “El Niño” phenomenon, and when the index 
takes values between 56 and 61 represent a strong “El Niño” phenomenon. 
From the launching of the wholesale electricity market in 1995, the driest period took place 
with the 1997 “El Niño” phenomenon. Other periods in which “El Niño” phenomenon was 
active correspond to the first month of 2005, the last four months of 2006 and early 2007, the 
last six months of 2009 and the first four of 2010 and the last three months of 2014 and the 
first three months of 2015 (Figure 1). The large share of hydraulic component in the 
electricity generation in Colombia makes the positive correlation between “El Niño” and the 
spot price to be high (approx. 30%). However, it is also important to bear in mind the effect 
other variables related to the economic fundamentals of the Colombian wholesale electricity 
                                                          
2 Currently in Colombian there are 17 power generation companies. 
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market, regulatory norms established by the gas and energy commission, regulatory risk 
aversion issues, etc., may have on the wholesale prices of electricity. In sum, the wholesale 
electricity market is a market with a fairly high level of complexity, where there are many 
variables that influence the price (Garcia et al, 2013; Hurtado et al., 2014; Santa Maria et al., 
2009). 
 
Figure 1. Wholesale price, bid price and MEI ranges, Colombia 
 
Note: MEI values above the upper threshold line represents a strong “El Niño” phenomenon.  
Source: Own elaboration based on data from XM and NOAA, 2015.  
 
Figure 2 shows the relationship between the average wholesale price and the hydrological 
levels. The measure of the hydrological levels includes mainly water reservoirs and the inputs 
from rivers and represents the total supply available nationwide for hydraulic generation. 
This causes that the negative correlation between hydrological levels and wholesale prices is 
of around 32%. Because hydrological levels represent the total supply available for a given 
period of time, movements in the chart that lead to a direct correlation cannot be observed. 
However, it can be seen in some periods, for example, in early 2010 a large drop in 
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hydrological levels and a rise in the price. Also between 2013 and 2014 volatility in the 
hydrological levels resulting in greater price volatility can be observed. 
Figure 2. Wholesale price and hydrological levels, Colombia 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from XM, 2015.  
 
Most electricity generating plants are in the territory of the National Interconnected System 
(SIN). The Andean Region and the Central Atlantic Coast are mainly hydraulic generating 
regions whereas the Atlantic Coast is mainly a thermal generating region (see figure 2). This 
fact is not unrelated to the strategic geographical location of the generation plants. The type 
of source used to produce power is region-specific; the hydraulic generation is located in the 
Andean Region. 
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Figure 3. Location of electricity generating plants 
 
Source: Compiled from XM and the website of each generating company 
 
  
10 
 
3.2 The wholesale price mechanism 
The Colombian wholesale electricity market is coordinated by the administrator, a company 
name XM. It operates as a “day-ahead” market: Every day is divided into 24 hour periods 
and a single price covers all purchases and sales in that hour period. Pool prices are based on 
bid schedules submitted daily by each generator detailing the prices at which they would be 
willing to supply power from each of the units they own obtaining a positive slope stepped 
supply curve. Using demand forecasts for the following day, the administrator determines a 
system marginal price (SMP) for each hour period based on the bid of the most expensive 
generating unit used to meet forecast demand. (see Figure 4). 
Figure 4. System marginal price mechanism 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
In addition, taking into account that forecast demand does not necessarily coincides with the 
real-time demand, the administrator in accordance with the rules established by the regulator 
of the electricity market (known in Colombia as Comisión de Regulación de Energía y Gas-
CREG), sets on top of the system marginal price an extra payment that is designated to 
compensate the generators for making their capacities available due to transmission 
constraints. These extra payments in the Colombian electricity market are known as 
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reconciliación positiva3 (positive reconciliation). These type of extra-payments which in this 
case refer to the payments given to generators due to the mismatch between demand forecast 
and real-time demand can also be given to guarantee the quality of the service (electricity) 
provided by the generators, technically known as automatic generation control (AGC). 
 
4. Datasets and Descriptive statistics 
 
4.1 Datasets 
This study combines the use of two main datasets. The first one is provided by the Market 
Operator, XM, on its website www.xm.com.co under the heading “Portal BI”. The second 
one is provided by the Department for National Statistics – DANE (www.dane.gov.co). 
“Portal BI” provides information for each electricity generation unit on the following 
variables:  
Bid Price (BD), positive reconciliation (PR), electricity generation (GEN) and electricity 
inputs (IN). The first three variables are measured in COP4/kWh and last two ones are 
measured in kWh. BD and IN variables are provided daily whereas the remaining one are 
provided hourly. Information on the system marginal prices (SMP) which are measured in 
COP/kWh and provided hourly are also obtained via “Portal BI”.  
From these raw data, we have computed monthly averages for the price-variables and used 
monthly cumulated values for the quantity-variables over the period January 2005 to August 
2015 for the 17 largest hydraulic plants.  
We have also controlled for the economic cycle by using an index of industrial employment 
(IE) obtained from DANE. 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
3 In the standard literature on electricity markets these extra payments are carried out in the so-called 
balancing markets 
4 COP is the international acronym for the Colombian currency (Peso Colombiano) 
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Table 3. Description of variables  
Variable Units of 
measurement 
Frequency 
(raw data) 
Constructed 
data 
Bid Price (BD) COP/kWh daily Monthly 
average 
Positive 
reconciliation (PR) 
KWh hourly 
 
Cumulated 
Monthly 
(daily average) 
System marginal 
Price (SMP) 
COP/kWh  
hourly 
 
Monthly 
average 
Generation (GEN) kWh hourly 
 
Cumulated 
monthly 
(daily average) 
Electricity inputs 
(IN) 
kWh daily 
 
Cumulated 
monthly 
Industrial 
employment index 
(EI) 
No units monthly Monthly 
Source: Portal BI, XM and National Department of Statistics - DANE 
 
4.2 Descriptive statistics by Hydrological Region 
A first approach to the influence of the geographical location of generating plants5 on the 
electricity bid prices in Colombia can be seen in table 1. This table gathers information on: 
the average bid price; electricity generation; the positive reconciliation; and the average 
electricity inputs of each of the hydrological regions determined by the market operator, XM. 
The hydrological regions show different means and standard deviations for each variable 
even though the country is interconnected. A first observation indicates that the spatial 
location of the electricity generating plants has an important effect on the variable electricity 
inputs, which shows significant differences depending on hydrological region. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
5Corresponds to the power generation with the largest hydraulic plants of the market. They represent 
approximately 65% of the power generation which does not include the generation with thermal technology. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Units Hydrological Region Mean Standard dev Min. Max. 
BP COP/kWh 
Antioquia 103.81 79.95 28.37 561.01 
Caribe 167.15 130.68 27.77 678.96 
Centro 263.24 423.81 30.58 2598.28 
Oriente 95.04 90.98 27.77 1270.09 
Valle 497.06 629.33 36.31 3310.52 
GEN kWh 
Antioquia 8,946,368 6,473,121 991,240 33,900,000 
Caribe 4,524,529 1,518,535 1,477,799 8,274,757 
Centro 4,140,286 3,667,998 41,452 13,400,000 
Oriente 16,400,000 5,201,984 3,194,778 35,300,000 
Valle 3,727,498 2,556,000 25,075 12,400,000 
IN kWh 
Antioquia 269,000,000 188,000,000 23,700,000 1,820,000,000 
Caribe 112,000,000 51,000,000 15,600,000 215,000,000 
Centro 111,000,000 103,000,000 2,676,100 447,000,000 
Oriente 486,000,000 361,000,000 8,686,000 2,320,000,000 
Valle 90,000,000 71,600,000 3,419,900 331,000,000 
PR kWh 
Antioquia 316,834 482,559 0 4,740,703 
Caribe 200,613 324,946 11,082 1,591,858 
Centro 440,325 632,385 654 3,770,229 
Oriente 1,049,850 1,289,723 127 8,921,401 
Valle 190,971 260,040 0 2,339,498 
Source: Own elaboration      
 
 
These differences in the observed means may be due to differences in the physical 
capabilities of the regions to generate electricity or to differences in weather conditions 
caused by the physical geography of the regions. Moreover and from a general perspective, 
the differences in electricity inputs caused by weather conditions could either be 
homogeneous or heterogeneous across the territory. In the particular case of Colombia we 
argue that the spatial heterogeneity is playing an important role on the level variation of 
electricity inputs. This fact is reflected in the bid price setting strategies of the electricity 
generating units. 
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Using the Spearman correlation coefficient6 between the electricity inputs of each of the 
hydrological regions7 (Table 2) it can be observed that two correlations are not statistically 
significant, Valle-Caribe and Valle-Oriente). These two correlations might imply that the 
electricity generating units located in those territories behave strategically with regard to their 
bid price setting strategies. For example, if electricity generating units located in the Valle 
region know that those located in the Oriente region have low hydrological levels, the 
electricity generating units located in Valle could exploit this situation by increasing their bid 
prices. Of course, in this decision is important to take into account the behavior of the 
demand. Thus, this preliminary analysis gives some hints about the potential effects of the 
plant location on the bid price setting strategies. In the next section a spatial econometric 
model which incorporates locational elements related to the generators is estimated. These 
locational features will become a key element in explaining the bid price setting strategies of 
the electricity generating plants in Colombia. 
 
Table 2. Spearman's rank correlation coefficient for the Electricity inputs 
 Energy inputs 
 Antioquia Caribe Centro Oriente Valle 
            
Antioquia 1.000         
        
Caribe 0.628 1.000     
  0.000         
Centro 0.423 0.350 1.000     
  0.000 0.000       
Oriente 0.572 0.713 0.676 1.000   
  0.000 0.000 0.000     
Valle 0.375 -0.052 0.418 -0.036 1.000 
  0.000 0.561 0.000 0.691   
Source: Own elaboration 
 
5. Econometric specification 
 
5. 1 Econometric specification 
                                                          
6 This correlation is similar to the Pearson correlation, but is less vulnerable to extreme values that may arise 
in the series 
7 For development of the Spearman's rank correlation coefficient, see Conover (1999). 
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We depart from the ideas of Ivaldi et al. (2003) and Bernheim and Whinston (1990) to 
estimate the main factors influencing the bid price set by an electricity generating unit (BP). 
Our econometric model takes into account the following variables: the system marginal price 
(SMP), electricity generation (GEN), electricity inputs (IN) and payments by positive 
reconciliation (PR). An index of industrial employment (EI) is also added to capture the 
behaviour of the economic activity. 
The estimated econometric specification is given by the following equation:  
 ln 𝐵𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑀𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐼𝐸𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡     
𝜀𝑖𝑡 ∶ 𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒                                                                                                        (1)   
 
Where the sub-indexes i and t stand for electricity generating unit and time period 
respectively. 
BP is the bid price of electricity measured in (kWh) and expressed in logs 
SMP is the system marginal price-expressed in Colombian pesos- of electricity measured 
in (COP/kWh) and expressed in logs 
GEN is the electric generation measured in (kWh) and expressed in logs  
IN are the energy inputs measured in (kWh) and expressed in logs 
PR are the positive reconciliations paid to the firms measured in (KWh) 
IE is an index of industrial employment 
Eit is the error term 
Equation (1) will be estimated by Pooled OLS using a sample of 2176 observations which 
correspond to the 17 largest electricity generating units with monthly data from January 2005 
until August 2015. 
 
5. 2 Estimation approach  
 
5.2.1 Baseline estimation  
Our point of departure consists of estimating equation (1) by Pooled OLS (Column #1). It 
can be seen that all the estimated coefficients are statistically significant and the signs are in 
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line with the economic rationale of this type of markets. However one of the advantages of 
having a panel data is that it allows us to control for unobservable individual heterogeneity 
across our units of observation. In order to fit the best model both fixed and random effects 
are applied to the estimation of equation (1). The results of these estimations are shown in 
columns #2 and #3. Again, as in the Pooled OLS estimation, the coefficients are statistically 
significant and the signs according to the expectations. The Hausman test points us that the 
best model is the random effects model which does not reject the null hypothesis of random 
effects with a p-value of 0.0273.  
 
Table 4. Results of non-spatial panel 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 
Pooled OLS 
Fixed-effects 
(within) 
regression 
Random-
effects GLS 
regression 
    
Log National Stock price 0.798*** 0.808*** 0.809*** 
 (0.034) (0.027) (0.027) 
Log Generation -0.489*** -0.710*** -0.697*** 
 (0.017) (0.027) (0.026) 
Industrial employment index 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Energy inputs -4.07e-10*** -1.14e-10* -1.15e-10* 
 (6.50e-11) (6.24e-11) (6.22e-11) 
Log Positive Reconciliation 0.115*** 0.089*** 0.090*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Constant 5.587*** 9.253*** 9.050*** 
 (0.566) (0.585) (0.587) 
    
Observations 2,176 2,176 2,176 
R-squared 0.529 0.500 0.502 
Number of plants 17 17 17 
Plant fixed effects  SI NO 
Moran's I 3.081     
LM Spatial Lag 62.195   
LM Spatial Error 8.564   
Robust LM Spatial Lag 151.171   
Robust LM Spatial Error 97.539   
Pesaran's test of cross sectional independence   
3.750  
(p=0.0002) 
3.878 
(p=0.0001) 
Standard errors between parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Own elaboration 
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However in the electricity generating markets with a predominant share of hydraulic 
technology such as the Colombian case, the electricity generating units may have different 
strategic behaviours in their bid price setting strategies linked to the different geographic 
locations of the plants since climatic conditions vary quite drastically from one location to 
the other8. The influence of these type of location-specific strategic behaviours cannot be 
estimated with standard econometric techniques. A good avenue to go forward is by applying 
spatial econometrics. Moreover, positive spatial dependence among the residuals was found 
by using the Moran´s I test.  The value of the test is 3.081 significant at 1% level9. The next 
subsection shows the results of our preferred specification. 
 
5.2.2 Preferred estimation: a spatial Durbin model 
In order to identify the right spatial econometric model we have followed Florax et al. (2003). 
It is important to bear in mind that Florax et al. (2003) recommendations are usually applied 
in a cross-section setting using Lagrange multiplier tests. In our case, due to the nature of the 
data (panel data) an adaptation of these tests has been carried out.  
Florax et al. (2003) divides into two approaches the process to get the right spatial 
econometric specification: In the first approach we depart from a non-spatial model. This 
non-spatial model is tested by applying the Lagrange multipliers (LM spatial lag, LM Spatial 
error, Robust LM Spatial Lag, Robust LM Spatial error tests) to check for the existence of 
substantive or residual spatial dependence in the residuals of the pooled model. If these 4 
tests reject the null hypothesis of non-spatial dependence, the model with the highest value 
in the tests is the one chosen. This first approach lead us to either estimate a spatial error 
model (SER) or a spatial lag model (SLM). However this election comes at a cost of 
neglecting a broad picture of the spatial dependence. To avoid this risk the second approach 
in Florax et al. (2003) propose the following: to depart from a Durbin spatial type of model 
and applied a) the common factor hypothesis to check for the validity of a spatial error model. 
In case of rejecting this hypothesis the next step is b) to apply the Wald test to check for the 
                                                          
8 In a different setting, Wolfram (1998) analyses strategic behaviors of the electricity generating units in 
England and Wales to set their bid prices over marginal costs  
9 The Pesaran´s test rejects the null hypothesis of no-dependence across the units of analysis in the fixed and 
random effects models (electricity generating plants)  
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validity of a spatial lag model. If the null is rejected the data generating process corresponds 
to a spatial Durbin model10.   
We have followed these recommendations as it is shown in table 4 in order to get our 
preferred specification. The results of the Lagrange´s tests, both standard and robust, reject 
the null hypothesis of non-spatial dependence at the 1% significance level. Moreover, the 
highest value for the Lagrange statistics are obtained for the LM Spatial Lag (62.195) and 
Robust LM Spatial Lag (151.171) which points us to a spatial lag type of model specification 
(SLM). However, the estimation of a SLM could not capture the whole structure of the spatial 
dependence present in our data set. To corroborate this fact, and following Florax et al. (2003) 
recommendations, we have checked for the common factor hypothesis. The results of these 
tests are shown in table 5 for a Chi-square statistic with one degree of freedom with values 
of 23.77 and 7.98 (1% significance level) for the standard and robust versions respectively.  
Therefore, based on the previous tests, our preferred specification corresponds to a Durbin 
Spatial model which takes the following econometric specification (2):  
 ln 𝐵𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝜌𝑊𝑖𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1 l 𝑛 𝑆𝑀𝑃 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿1𝑊𝑖𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡+ 𝛿2𝑊𝑖𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿3𝑊𝑖𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐼𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 .    
𝜀𝑖𝑡 ∶ 𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒                                                                                                        (2)   
 
Where the sub-indexes i and t stand for electricity generating unit and time period 
respectively and the definitions of the variables BP, SMP, GEN, IN, PR and IE are the same 
as in equation (1). Additionally, the spatial Durbin model takes into consideration the spatial 
lags of BP (WBP), GEN (WGEN), IN (WIN), and PR (WPR). The elements (𝑤𝑖𝑗, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗) of 
the weighting matrix, W, represent the inverse of the Euclidean distance between plants “𝑖” 
and “𝑗”. The distance values (𝑑𝑖𝑗) have been computed using data on the longitude and 
latitude of each electricity generating unit. The main diagonal takes the “0” values. Finally, 
W has been row-standardized to sum 1 to easy of interpretation. 
The proposed weighting scheme jointly with the Colombian physical geography 
characterizes a situation in which the probability of having different climatic conditions 
                                                          
10 For a more comprehensive analysis of this methodology see Florax et al. (2003)  
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increases with the distance between the plants and therefore this implies two things: a) The 
degree of similarity among the strategies of the plants increases the closer they are to each 
other, and b) the intensity of the strategic behavior among the plants increases the farther 
away they are to each other.  
Finally, Eit is the error term.  
Equation (2) is estimated by maximum likelihood using monthly data from January 2005 
until August 2015 for the 17th largest electric generating units. The panel is made up of 2.176 
observations and it is strongly balanced. 
Table 5 presents the results of estimating equation (2) with random effects since the 
Hausman´s test with a statistical value of 3.26 does not allow us to reject the null hypothesis. 
The coefficient estimates are presented jointly with the associated standard (open brackets) 
and robust errors (closed brackets). It can be seen that for the estimation with “standard 
errors” all the coefficients with the exception of those corresponding to the variables energy 
inputs and the spatial lag of the log of positive reconciliation are statistically significant and 
the signs are according to the theoretical expectations. In the estimation with “robust errors” 
the coefficient associated to the index of industrial employment also loses its significance. It 
is worth commenting the lack of significance of the variable energy inputs vis-à-vis the 
significance of its spatial lag and the significance of the variable log of positive reconciliation 
vis-à-vis with the lack of significance of its spatial lag. In the first case, the results tell us that 
in the bid price setting strategies of each electricity generating unit what matters the most is 
the relative level of energy inputs of its competitors. The negative sign of the spatial lag for 
the variable energy inputs implies that the higher the level of the energy inputs of the 
competitors the lower should be the bid price set by the electricity generating unit. In the 
second case, the lack of significance of the spatial lag is based on the absence of market for 
the payments for positive reconciliation (they are assigned by regulation). Therefore, each 
electricity generating unit does not factor in its bid price setting strategies the positive 
reconciliation of its competitors11.  
                                                          
11 The Wald tests shown in table 5 (in the robust estimations) do not reject the null hypothesis of non-joint 
significance of the spatial lags when the spatial lag of positive reconciliation is included. However, when this 
is excluded, the null hypothesis of non-joint significance is rejected. These results reinforce the idea that the 
spatial lags of energy inputs and generation gather the strategic effects link to the location the electricity 
generating units. 
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Finally, with regard to the spatial lag of log generation, its coefficient is negative which 
means that a decrease in the generation levels of the rivals increases the bid price set by our 
electricity generating unit. The reason of this negative relationship obeys mainly to two 
factors, one link to the nature of this market and the other link to the particular geographical 
features of Colombia. With regard to the first factor, the wholesale electricity market in 
Colombia is highly inelastic and therefore a shortage of generation automatically implies an 
increase in the bid price set by the company. According to the second factor, the different 
location of the electricity generating units, which at the same time imply different weather 
conditions, implies that the generation levels varies quite substantially among them. For 
instance, if the electricity generating units located in the Andean region are under a rainy 
season whereas those located in the Central Atlantic Coast are under a dry season, the first 
ones, knowing that there is a shortage of generation in the Central Atlantic Coast, will have 
incentives to set higher bid prices. This second factor, which is at the hearth of the goals of 
our paper, would be negligible if the geographical features of Colombia were homogeneous 
across the country. 
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Table 5. Results of the Durbin model 
  (1) 
VARIABLES Random-effects 
regression Log SMP 0.589 
 (0.047)*** 
 [0.076]*** 
Log GEN -0.679 
 (0.026)*** 
 [0.065]*** 
IE 0.015 
 (0.003)*** 
 [0.009] 
IN 7.21e-11 
 (8.01e-11) 
 [1.24e-10] 
Log PR 0.090 
 (0.007)*** 
 [0.034]*** 
W*Log GEN -0.202 
 (0.079)** 
 [0.114]* 
W*IN -3.72e-10 
 (1.32e-10)*** 
 [1.82e-10]** 
W* Log PR -0.023 
 (0.018) 
 [0.038] 
rho 0.211 
 (0.041)*** 
 [0.077]*** 
  
Observations 2,176 
R-squared 0.534 
Number of plants 17 
Wald test spatial lag x3 9.05 (p=0.0108) 
Wald test spatial lag x3 
(Robust errors) 
3.21 (p=0.2006) 
Wald test spatial lag x2 6.59 (p=0.0103) 
Wald test spatial lag x2 
(Robust errors) 
3.15 (p=0.0761) 
Wald test spatial error 23.77 (p=0.0000) 
Wald test spatial error 
(Robust errors) 
7.98 (p=0.0185) 
Hausman Test 3.26 (p=1.0000) 
Standard errors between parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Robust standard errors between square brackets 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
22 
 
The econometric results of table 5 are complemented by the computation of the marginal 
effects (table 6) which are broken down into direct and indirect effects following the 
methodology of Drukker et al. (2010).  
In general terms, the direct effects can be attributed to the self-effect of the electricity 
generating unit; in contrast, the indirect effects can be divided into global spatial effects that 
are dynamically dispersed throughout the system and local spatial effects, attributed to the 
neighborhood context which is not extended beyond. 
The results in table 6 show that the indirect effect associated to energy inputs is statistically 
significant and negative whereas the direct effect is not statistically significant. This is in line 
with the results obtained in table 5. This result shows that the spillover effects are greater 
than the own-effects. This indicates how important is the location of an electricity generating 
unit in comparison with the location of its rivals. That is, electricity generating units act 
strategically, not only by taking into account their location but also that of their rivals. 
In relation to generation, it is worth remark that the indirect effect is quite sizeable (-0.465) 
representing around 40% of the total marginal effect of generation (-1.152). With regard to 
the positive reconciliation the indirect effect is not statistically significant, confirming the 
lack of a balancing market associated to the Colombian wholesale electricity market. Finally, 
the bid price-elasticity of generation is elastic (-1.152), whereas the bid price-elasticity of 
positive reconciliation is inelastic (0.081). 
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Table 6. Direct and Indirect effects (Average) 
    Robust Estimation 
VARIABLES Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total 
Log SMP 0.592 0.153 0.744 0.591 0.161 0.753 
 (0.039)*** (0.024)*** (0.037)*** (0.064)*** (0.068)** (0.091)*** 
Log GEN -0.688 -0.445 -1.133 -0.686 -0.465 -1.152 
 (0.028)*** (0.094)*** (0.097)*** (0.071)*** (0.161)*** (0.183)*** 
IE 0.015 0.004 0.019 0.016 0.005 0.021 
 (0.003)*** (0.001)*** (0.004)*** (0.010) (0.005) (0.015) 
IN 6.04e-11 -4.46e-10 -3.85e-10 5.60e-11 -4.69e-10 -4.13e-10 
 (7.44e-11) (1.46e-10)*** (1.21e-10)*** (1.20e-10) (1.91e-10)** (1.55e-10)** 
Log PR  0.091 -0.006 0.085 0.091 -0.010 0.081 
  (0.007)*** (0.021) (0.022)*** (0.035)** (0.036) (0.023)*** 
Standard errors between brackets ***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1. 
Source: Own Elaboration 
 
6. Conclusions 
Traditionally, the analysis of the bid price setting strategies in the wholesale electricity 
markets where the predominant generation technology is hydraulic, is carried out without 
considering the impact the spatial heterogeneity has on the weather conditions. Colombia's 
physical geography varies greatly throughout the territory which generates a sizeable 
differential impact on weather conditions across the country. The electricity wholesale 
market in Colombian is very much dependent on the different impact that “El Niño” 
phenomenon causes across the territory. Using monthly data over the period January 2005-
August 2015 on bid prices, generation, energy inputs and positive reconciliation for the 17 
largest hydraulic electricity generating units jointly with data on system marginal prices, 
employment industrial index and data gathering information on the specific location of the 
plants and the distance among them, this paper estimates a spatial Durbin model for the bid 
price setting strategies of the electricity generating units. This type of specification allows us 
to explicitly consider not only the different geographic location of the plants but also their 
location-based strategic behaviors.  
This paper reports three main results with regard to the bid price setting strategies of the 
electricity generating units: first, the spatial lag of the energy inputs variable shows up as 
negative and statistically significant whereas the variable energy inputs do not. The economic 
rationale of this result is based on the oligopoly nature of this type of markets but in this case 
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this effect is reinforced by the fact that we take explicitly into account the differences in 
weather conditions according to the location of the plants. Plants strategically impound water 
to offer it when the price is higher. 
Second, the payments for positive reconciliation to the rivals do not show up as statistically 
significant. This is explained on account of the fact that in Colombia payments for positive 
reconciliation are established by the regulator (CREG) and, therefore, generators do not 
factor in the payments made to the rivals in their price setting strategies.  
Third, the spatial lag of log generation is negative which is explained by on the one hand the 
inelastic nature of this market and on the other by the fact that the generation levels of the 
plants differ largely due to the different impact of weather conditions. This second factor, 
which is at the hearth of the goals of our paper, would be negligible if the geographical 
features of Colombia were homogeneous across the country. 
One potential policy recommendation derived from our results is the need to implement a 
market for the positive reconciliation payments with the aim to give more efficient signals in 
the price setting strategies and avoid arbitrary interventions by the regulator in these markets 
as it happens in most electricity international markets such as California, JPM (New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania and Maryland), Nord Pool and the UK, among others. 
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